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Abstract
ICMI is inseparable with the rise of  the middle class Muslim communities 
in Indonesia. This is because the roles and contributions of  ICMI are very 
significant in the development of  middle class Muslim communities. Although 
the establishment of  ICMI has its pros and cons, it is undeniable that ICMI’s 
contributions towards development of  the Muslim communities are huge. This 
article aims to identify the roles and contributions of  ICMI in the development 
of  middle class Muslim communities in Indonesia in the New Order era. The 
roles of  ICMI are based on education and economic aspects, the consolidation 
of  the Islamic movement in Indonesia aspects, and the political agenda aspects. 
Based on our findings, we conclude that ICMI is deemed to be the pioneer of  
middle class Muslim communities’ revival in Indonesia especially in the New 
Order era.
[ICMI tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan kebangkitan masyarakat Muslim 
kelas menengah di Indonesia. Hal ini disebabkan peran dan kontribusi ICMI 
sangat signifikan dalam perkembangan masyarakat Muslim kelas menengah. 
Meskipun pendirian ICMI diliputi pro dan kontra, namun tidak dapat 
sangkal bahwa kontribusi ICMI terhadap pembangunan masyarakat Muslim 
kelas menengah sangat besar. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi 
peran dan kontribusi ICMI terhadap perkembangan masyarakat Muslim 
kelas menengah di Indonesia pada zaman Orde Baru. Peran ICMI ini 
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ditinjau dari aspek pendidikan dan ekonomi, aspek konsolidasi gerakan Islam 
Indonesia, dan aspek agenda politik. Berdasarkan hasil penemuan, kami 
menyimpulkan bahwa ICMI dapat dianggap sebagai pelopor kebangkitan 
masyarakat Muslim kelas menengah di Indonesia terutama pada zaman 
Orde Baru.]
Keywords: Indonesia, ICMI, middle class Muslim communities, 
Soeharto, New Order
A. Introduction
At the time of  Soeharto’s New Order, the middle class Muslim 
communities allegedly intended to establish an Islamic state in 
Indonesia, an ambition strongly opposed by Soeharto. In 1985, he 
took immediate action to prevent its incurrence. The action taken was 
to implement Pancasila1 as the sole foundation of  the country and 
forced all organisations and political parties to accept it. By doing so, 
organisations and political parties that practiced the fundamentals of  
Islam, communists, or certain religions are banned. 
Nevertheless, the middle class communities, especially the 
intellectuals, were deemed as one of  the pioneers and drivers of  change 
towards a more democratic society.2  The same opinion was also expressed 
by Pramono, but he termed the Muslim communities as “santri“ (Muslim 
students). He said that the emergence of  new middle class students (new 
santri) in the 1990s led to the recovery of  the country’s relationship with 
the Muslim communities. The middle class new students were formed 
by the intellectual circle that was active in education and bureaucracy. 
Pramono provided example of  ICMI (Indonesian Association of  Muslim 
1  The five are belief  in God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and 
social justice. These principles were first enunciated by the nationalist leader Soekarno 
in a speech on June 1, 1945, when Indonesians were preparing to take power from the 
Japanese at the end of  the Pacific War. Soekarno was trying to convince Islamic leaders, 
who wanted a state based on Islam, to accept his broader formulation, primarily on the 
grounds that Christian areas would secede from an Islamic Indonesian state, see J.D. 
Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
2 Muhammad A.S. Hikam, Politik Kewarganegaraan: Landasan Redemokratisasi di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1999).
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Intellectuals) as the new rise of  the middle class students in Indonesia.3 
In parallel, the role of  ICMI was deemed to be the pioneer of  the 
revival of  the middle class Muslim communities in Indonesia. Hefner 
who examined the background of  ICMI’s establishment and its roles 
up to 1993 concluded that the birth of  ICMI was an orientation and 
the struggles of  middle class Muslims in political and cultural aspects of  
modern Indonesia, simultaneously changing the map and the political 
alliances done by the New Order regime in early 1990s.4
There are several articles that discussed ICMI and the emergence of  
Muslim middle class communities in Indonesia. Muzani (1994),5 Muzani 
(1995), Hefner (1995), Liddle (1996), Rizal & Liddle (1996), Bertrand 
(1996), Suryadinata (1997), Hamayotsu (2002) and Salim (2011) debated 
about the relationship between Soeharto with ABRI (Armed Forces of  
the Republic of  Indonesia) that was not initially harmonious and the 
establishment of  ICMI comprising middle class Muslims which has the 
blessing of  Soeharto. They also discussed the rise of  the middle class 
Indonesian Muslims and Soeharto’s change of  attitude towards Muslims 
after the birth of  ICMI. Issues of  democracy and openness and political 
interests of  Soeharto in ICMI were also discussed.  
Unfortunately, their writings are mainly about the relationship 
between Soeharto and ABRI, the emergence of  ICMI, the rise of  middle 
class Muslim communities and Soeharto’s political interests in ICMI to 
maintain his power. Meanwhile, the issue of  the role of  ICMI against the 
rise of  middle class Muslim communities was forgotten. In fact, the issue 
of  the role of  ICMI is very important to be discussed to determine the 
contributions of  ICMI specifically in the development of  the middle class 
Muslim communities and the country’s progress in general. Consequently, 
this article discusses the roles of  ICMI in the rise of  the middle class 
Indonesian Muslim communities in the New Order era. 
In order to reach this objective, this article has used secondary 
3 Pramono U. Tanthowi, Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri: Islam dan Demokratisasi 
di Indonesia 1990-2000 (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban, 2005).
4  Robert W. Hefner, ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia, trans. 
by Endi Haryono (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1995).
5 Saiful Mujani, “Kultur Kelas Menengah dan Kelahiran ICMI”, Studia Islamika, 
vol. 1, no. 1 (1994), pp. 207–35.
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data by using library research. The required data is collected through 
library resources such as books, journals authoritative internet materials 
and any previous works related to the objectives of  this article directly 
or indirectly. These secondary data have been collected for almost six 
months. Then, these data have been analysed following predetermined 
themes by using descriptive-analytic method. The using library research 
based on research approach in order to investigate and explore the role of  
ICMI to build middle class Muslim communities in Indonesia particularly 
in the New Order era. Besides, library research was aimed to find out the 
contributions of  ICMI as pioneer of  the rising of  middle class Muslim 
communities in New Order era.  
B. Middle Class Muslim Communities 
Sociologists generally divide the class of  capitalist society into 
three, namely:
1. The upper class that has the productive resources and hold 
economic role as investor.
2. The middle class that has educational qualifications or technical 
training and economic role as white-collar workers or better known as 
the professionals (management and administration).
3. The lower class that has physical energy and become laborers 
or manual workers in the production of  goods and services.6
In modern era, the middle class is the group with most people 
in the developed and developing countries. However, Suryadinata says 
that the concept of  middle class in the Asian context is unclear. Some 
refer to Muslim traders, administration officials, and professionals and 
army personnel. Others restrict it to professionals and entrepreneurs. 
Referring to the Western definition, the middle class in Indonesia is still 
small. In 1990, those referred to as the middle class are “professional and 
technical” and “managers and administrators” groups who comprised 
only 3.9 percent of  Indonesia’s population at that time.7
According to Karl Marx, farmers, small entrepreneurs and small 
6 Kntayya Mariappan, Ketidaksamaan Sosial (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 
2000).
7 Leo Suryadinata, “Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto’s 
Indonesia”, Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 3 (1997), pp. 269–280.
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traders are the remnants of  the pre-capitalism economy. This group 
was known as the middle class which was basically a group from the 
period of  transition. They were also considered as small bourgeoisie that 
have conservative tendencies mindset. They were ranked between the 
working class and the capitalist class and landlords. With the existence 
of  the transitional position, it is said to blur the boundaries between the 
workers and the bourgeois.8
Unlike Marx, the founder of  modern sociology, Max Weber divided 
capitalist society economically into five classes, namely (1) the bourgeoisie 
class, (2) the working class, (3) the educated class, (4) the managers or 
administrators class, (5) small bourgeoisie, which refers to the traditional 
small bourgeois made up of  businessmen, traders and farmers. This last 
group was closest to Marx’s opinion.9 The middle class itself  can be 
divided into three parts, the upper-middle class, mid-middle class and 
lower-middle class.10
Upper-middle class comprised of  professional management 
and administration of  the highest level. Mid-middle class was staffed 
by other professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, lecturers, 
accountants, and others. Meanwhile the lower-middle class comprised 
of  low level service workers.11 Regardless, what is meant by middle class 
communities are those whose position are between the working class 
and the bourgeoisie or between the upper class and the lower class. In 
the context of  this discussion, it is understood that middle class Muslim 
communities are group of  Muslims who are placed between the working 
class and the bourgeoisie or between upper and lower class communities 
whose livelihoods are lucrative and well educated.
In Indonesia, the rise of  the middle class Muslim communities 
can be seen from the establishment of  ICMI at the end of  1990. ICMI 
consists of  Indonesian Muslim educated leaders or intellectuals and based 
on the concept of  the middle class community described above, they are 
8 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Masyarakat Madani: Agama, Kelas Menengah, dan Perubahan 
Sosial (Jakarta: LP3ES-LSAF, 1999).
9 Ibid.
10 Noran Fauziah Yaakub, Pengantar Sosiologi (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti 
Sdn Bhd, 1987). 
11 Mariappan, Ketidaksamaan Sosial.
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included in the category of  middle class community12. Therefore, it is 
not wrong to say that the rise of  the middle class Muslim communities 
in Indonesia relates to the existence of  ICMI and the role it plays.
C. Middle Class Muslim Communities in Indonesia
The emergence of  the middle class Muslim communities in the 
Dutch colonial era can be seen from the birth of  the Syarikat Islam 
(SI) in the 1910s which had hundreds of  thousands of  members and 
Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), the 1920s Islamic youth organization 
with its leaders KH. Agus Salim and H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. Then the 
establishment of  the Masyumi Party in the Old Order period followed. 
The emergence of  middle class Muslims in both eras was more likely 
to be preceded by political movements and Islamic organisations. This 
is in contrast to the rise of  the middle class Muslim communities in the 
New Order era which resulted from education and thought movement.
There are three classes of  middle class Muslim communities 
in Indonesia, namely: First, modern elderly, especially Masyumi party 
supporters, who strived to champion formal political pursuit.13 However, 
since Masyumi was banned and not authorized to carry out political 
activities, this group changed its struggle by establishing Parmusi 
(Indonesian Muslim Party).14 Secondly, young people who are not 
directly involved with Masyumi, those who did not form a new party 
but participated in the New Order political activity through recognised 
existing parties. They continued to be involved in the bureaucracy and 
support the modernist movement.15 Thirdly, the younger generation. 
Although this group supported the elderly in the politics and the young 
people in the bureaucratic matters, their tendency was to build the basic 
12 The establishment of  ICMI gave rise to hopes on the part of  the middle-class 
Muslims of  gaining favors from the government and access to the formal channels 
of   influence, see Kikue Hamayotsu, “Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: 
Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3 (2002), 
pp. 353–375.
13 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Intelektual Intelegensia dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa: Risalah 
Cendekiawan Muslim (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1993).
14 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara; Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik 
Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998).
15 Rahardjo, Intelektual Intelegensia dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa.
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structure necessary to support a more democratic political system. In 
other words, this group was more interested in community development 
activities and engaged in the fields of  thought and education, rather than 
political or bureaucratic matters.16
There are five phenomenons behind the rise of  the Indonesian 
middle class Muslim communities in the 1980s and early 1990s, as follows:
D. Wearing Headscarf  as Muslim Identity
The Islamic Revolution of  Iran which erupted in 1979 has 
influenced the world’s Muslims psychologically. After being marginalised 
for a long time, the Islamic revolution in Iran gave a new identity and pride 
to Muslims, including in Indonesia. Since the early 1980s, Indonesian 
Muslim women began to wear the headscarf  proudly. Following the 
victory of  the Islamic Revolution of  Iran, the phenomenon of  wearing 
the headscarf  in Indonesia has become a symbol of  Islamic resistance 
to Western cultural hegemony. Since  the 1980s,  the  influence of   this 
revolution has been strong in the Indonesian Muslim communities. 
According to Fathonah K. Daud, who studied about headscarf  and aurat 
of  women, the phenomenon of  wearing headscarf  in Indonesia was 
caused by two factors. Firstly, the external factor, which is the influence 
of  Ikhwan al Muslimin’s thinking and the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
that occurred in 1979. According to him, the influence of  the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution was fast affecting some of  
Indonesia’s communities at that time.
Secondly is the internal factor in which Soeharto’s policies on 
Muslims have been considered to marginalise the Muslims. But in the 
early 1990s, when Soeharto’s relationship with the Muslim communities 
improved, the New Order government automatically began accepting 
wearing headscarf  amongst Muslim women and was no longer considered 
as a symbol against the New Order regime.17 So it is not surprising that in 
the late 1980s, women wearing headscarf  were considered conservative 
and stupid. Students, undergraduates, and lecturers who wore the 
16 Ibid.
17 Fathonah K. Daud, “Jilbab, Hijab dan Aurat Perempuan: Antara Tafsir 
Klasik, Tafsir Kontemporer dan Pandangan Muslim Feminis”, Al Hikmah: Jurnal Studi 
Keislaman, vol. 3, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1–24.
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headscarf  were considered a fanatic and radical that must be eliminated. 
While  in  the work place, headscarf  was considered as unprofessional 
and not performing, so sometimes women wearing headscarf  were not 
accepted to work at certain places. If  accepted, her career will be blocked 
by her boss.18
Yet in the 1990s, many women, especially among Muslim 
undergraduates emerged covered, while carrying the Qur’an in their 
hands. Many of  them were seen in public places such as on the streets, 
universities, shopping malls, or in buses. They proudly wore Muslimah 
clothing everywhere, making it popular amongst students in the city. 
Islamic identity in the form of  Muslimah clothing has become a pride 
in the big city. It was then widely disseminated amongst Muslim women 
and female students which eventually touched the middle class. Within 
the middle class, the Muslimah dress gave another meaning. It is not just 
the expression of  religious consciousness but socially it functions as the 
reinforcement of  the identity and symbol of  the resurrection of  the 
middle class. Suzanne Brenner’s study on the use of  headscarf  among 
Javanese women showed that the widespread use of  headscarf  in the 
1980s among Muslim women has reinforced the spirit and identity of  
Muslim women in Java.19
E. Modern Islamic Music (Qasidah) 
When wearing a headscarf  was popular in the 1980s, at the same 
time, when the veil was popular, on the other hand in the 1980s, there 
was also a musical expression that sang a modern qasidah that became 
the symbol of  religion (Islam) and spiritual among the educated society 
in urban areas. Qasidah was deemed to be the answer to the spiritual 
emptiness of  the Muslim communities at that time. It has a modern 
characteristic compared to previous qasidahs and pop-like genre. The 
modern qasidah famous at that time was from the Bimbo group. Through 
this middle class special modern qasidah, the Bimbo group introduced 
18  Besse Risnayanti and Hafied Cangara, “Jilbab Sebagai Simbol Komunikasi 
di Kalangan Mahasiswa Universitas Hasanuddin: Studi Komunikasi Nonverbal”, 
KAREBA : Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi, vol. 1, no. 2 (2016), pp. 149–76.
19  Suzanne Brenner, “Reconstructing Self  and Society: Javanese Muslim Women 
and ‘The Veil’”, American Ethnologist, vol. 23, no. 4 (1996), pp. 673–97.
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another Islamic symbol that reinforced the identity of  the Islamic religion 
among the middle classes. The modern qasidah songs were aimed at 
bringing the taste of  religious music to the Muslim communities living 
in urban areas.20
The acceptance of  the middle class Muslim communities towards 
Bimbo’s modern qasidah music in the 1980s was because they were seeking 
“the expression of  peaceful, calming and soothing religious beauty”.21 It 
is an alternative to traditional qasidah dominated by Arabic instruments, 
songs and poems. Bimbo presented the different colors of  qasidah music 
that were dominated by modern musical instruments such as guitar, drum 
and others. The songs that Bimbo sung were popular among the Muslim 
middle class. As a well-known Islamic music band, Bimbo is often invited 
to sing their qasidah songs on television. Their appearance on television 
caused a lot of  people to watch and indirectly spread Islam at that time. 
F. Publications with Islamic Nuances
The development of  Islam in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s 
was also highlighted by the emergence of  Islamic nuanced publishers 
or printed media. One of  the most popular is Ulumul Qur’an Journal. 
The Ulumul Qur’an Journal was first launched in 1989. The editor was 
Dawam Rahardjo, an intellectual, NGO activist and one of  the founders 
of  ICMI. This Islamic publication was professionally managed and raised 
the issues of  pluralism, liberalism and inclusiveness. Its writing style also 
showed that there has emerged an educated element of  society, that is 
the middle class Muslim communities. Compared with other Islamic 
media, Ulumul Qur’an Journal was the most appreciated liberal Islamic 
Journal in Indonesia.22 
Before the 1980s, the Islamic publishing media was synonymous 
with the discussion of  fiqh, morality, tauhid with traditional and unattractive 
lay outs and formats. The presence of  Ulumul Quran Journal  affirmed 
20 Tatang Sumarsono, Sajadah Panjang Bimbo: 30 Tahun Perjalanan Kelompok Musik 
Religius (Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).
21 Mariana Ramelan, “Tahajudku Cuma Untuk Keluarga”, Ummat, vol. 1, no. 
16 (1996), pp. 87–9.
22  Robert W. Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among 
Indonesian Muslims”, Indonesia, no. 64 (1997), pp. 77–103.
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the emergence of  the middle class Muslim communities. Through this 
medium the Muslim middle class found their expression in the aspects 
of  publishing, thinking and Islamic materials. Thereafter, several other 
publishers emerged up with similar features, particularly for Muslim 
middle classes, such as Mizan, Paramadina Publishers, LKiS, Pustaka 
Pelajar, Pustaka, Qalam and others.
 The presence of  the Ulumul Quran Journal was seen to be very 
different compared to the publications before the 1980s. The obvious 
difference is that in the case where the issue raised could not be separated 
from the question of  pluralism and liberalism. The liberalness of  this 
journal can be seen from its features as follows: First, Ulumul Quran 
Journal threatened already established understanding in Islamic Indonesia. 
This is evident from the journal’s support of  the movement of  Islamic 
reforms voiced by Nurcholish Madjid. Secondly, Ulumul Quran Journal 
always conducted dialogues, seminars, and religious discussions with 
people from different religions. This was done by raising the theme 
of  religious pluralism and publishing writings from non-Muslim.23 
Thirdly, this journals highlighted broader themes such as science and 
technology, Islamic knowledge, future of  Islam, orientalism, religious 
literature, traditional Islamic mosaics, tasawuf and Islamic mysticism, 
Islam and postmodernism, Islamic reform, Islamic development in the 
West, Islamic philosophy, human rights, and gender. The richness of  the 
theme highlighted in the Ulumul Quran Journal, has placed and raised 
the reputation of  Ulumul Quran Journal as the most courageous journal 
in the Islamic world.24 The richness of  the theme and courage of  this 
journal has never been found in conventional Islamic media that existed 
before the 1980s.
23 The Ulumul Quran Journal has published articles of  non-Muslims, including 
the writings of  R. William Liddle, an American Indonesianist. Please read his writings 
in.“Scripturalism Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa 
Orde Baru”, Ulumul Qur’an, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 53–65. Nevertheless, Dawam 
Rahardjo, as editor-in-chief, explained that the Ulumul Quran Journal is an academic 
journal. This is because the journal is available to anyone including non-Muslim authors. 
Articles from non-Muslim authors are needed as comparative materials, see Rahardjo, 
Intelektual intelegensia dan perilaku politik bangsa.
24 Hefner, “Print Islam”.
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G. Held a Recitation in the Hotels
Since the 1980s, the typical middle-class recitation phenomenon has 
emerged and proliferated in star-rated hotels, luxury offices, televisions 
and other prestigious venues. Paramadina pioneered the recitation of  
packages in the form of  religious courses with high fees at the hotel. Some 
successful businessmen such as Abdul Latief, owner of  Pasaraya Mall 
and Director of  Sarinah Jaya, and Ahmad Ganis, Director of  PT. Radiant 
Utama, in collaboration with Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo and 
Fahmi Idris founded the religious studies club Paramadina in 1986. 
In January 1999, 50 executives from various companies participated 
in a program called “Pesantren Eksekutif ” (Executive Boarding School) 
held at Giri Gahana Golf  & Resort in Jatinangor, Bandung. For three 
days they tried to clear their hearts on the show for the future of  a 
better life. The event was organized by PT. Bimantara Citra, a company 
owned by Bambang Triatmodjo, the son of  former President Soeharto. 
This program is held every month for three years of  Ramadhan. Each 
participant paid Rp. 350,000 for three days. In 1999, more than 110 
executives enrolled but only 50 were accepted due to accommodation 
capacity issues. The same program was also held in several hotels in 
Jakarta such as Hilton Hotel, Senayan, for three days 8-10 January 1999. 
Here, every executive must pay registration to Rp. 950,000 for three days.25 
Due to the participants are executives, the cost becomes very expensive. 
Types of  recitation like that are still many more in big cities in Indonesia 
since the 1980s in line with an increasingly extensive Islamization process.
H. The Existence of  ICMI and the Resurgence of  Middle Class 
Muslim
From the above four phenomenons, ICMI’s birth is characterized 
as the most powerful phenomenon in the rise of  the middle class Muslim 
communities in Indonesia. After the existence of  ICMI in the late 1990s, 
middle class Muslim communities began to have the power to engage in 
the circle of  power. ICMI, a modern Islamic organisation representing the 
Muslim middle class, grew and developed into a significant middle class 
power. According to Arief  Budiman, this Muslim middle class has had 
25  Herry Mohammad and Taufik Abriansyah, “Pesantren Eksekutif: Agar Tak 
Menohok Kawan”, Gatra (1999), p. 70.
352 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Riki Rahman & Faisal S. Hazis
a big and rapid influence in the dynamism of  Islam in Indonesia. ICMI 
at the time was not only very influential but also expanding rapidly and 
vastly.26 Liddle mentioned in ICMI’s second congress in Jakarta, “Twelve 
hundred delegates, representing 42,000 members from all Indonesian 
provinces and from many Indonesian Islamic communities abroad, 
participated. Minister of  Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, generally 
considered President Soeharto’s favorite cabinet member, was chosen for 
a second five-year term as national chair. Sixteen ministers, nearly half  
the cabinet, were elected to the top positions, and the president himself  
was designated as ICMI’s “Protector” (Pelindung)”.27  
For the middle class communities in the urban areas, ICMI has 
become a symbol of  the rise of  the Muslim communities. In addition, 
ICMI has also become a symbol of  modern Islamic identity in which 
Muslims no longer feel marginalised. Previously, Muslims were 
synonymous with poverty, backwardness, and the Muslims tend to feel 
inferior with their religion, but now Islam is no longer seen as the religion 
of  the losers.28 In other words, through ICMI, Islam showed its modern 
image. Its impact in the 1990s, in which ICMI’s modernity has provided a 
reference for many Muslims to boldly demonstrate their Islamic identity. 
This phenomenon ultimately spread to staff  and government officials 
where they no longer feel embarrassed to show their Islamic identity. 
This Islamic expression continued to spread to government and private 
offices, hotels and so on. 
The rise of  the Muslim middle class has made the position of  
Muslims drastically changed politically and has a high bargaining position. 
The Muslim middle class who was previously marginalised, became an 
influential movement  in  the center of  power and was creating a new 
balance in pluralist Indonesian society. Many of  the middle class Muslims 
sat in the cabinet and the parliament. Due to the large influence of  Islamic 
26  Arief  Budiman, “From Lower to Middle Class: Political Activities Before 
and After 1988”, in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, ed. by J.D. Legge and David 
Bourchier (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of  Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 
1994).
27   R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, 
The Journal of  Asian Studies, vol. 55, no. 3 (1996), pp. 613–34.
28  Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan 
Tree (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
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politics at the time and quite a lot of  students sitting in government, 
William Liddle called the 1990s as “Islamic Turn in Indonesia”29.
I. Establishment of  ICMI
In line with development of  time, current middle class Muslim 
communities are expanding and varied, including in Indonesia. Just to 
mention, middle class Indonesian Muslim communities are made up 
of  scholars, preachers, civil servants, workers in the private sector and 
more. When Soeharto was elected as President, the fate of  Muslims was 
increasingly sidelined. They were not given opportunity to play a role in 
developing and advancing the country. In the era of  the 1970s and 1980s, 
the Muslims were not given ample opportunity by the government to 
also play a role in politics. They allegedly wanted to replace the Pancasila 
state foundation to Islam (anti-Pancasila).
In addition to repressive measures, the New Order also limited the 
social, political, and religious activities of  Muslims. Among them was the 
rejection of  the restoration of  Masyumi’s image, an Islamic based political 
party that was banned at the time of  Soekarno in 1960, the policy to unite 
Islamic parties into a single party, which was the United Development 
Party (PPP) starting 5 June 1972.30 As for the socio-religious context, the 
Soeharto regime implemented the “mandatory report” to anyone who 
would be conducting activities. The rule was that “all meetings involving 
more than five persons must obtain permission from the police.31 This 
matter narrowed the space for Muslims to participate in developing and 
advancing the country.
When Soeharto’s relationship with ABRI became disharmonious, 
he tried to turn his attention to the Muslims. This was because Muslims 
were seen to have the potential in developing the country, as well as 
to balance the power of  ABRI which was giving less support to the 
leadership of  Soeharto.32 L.B. Moerdani, Minister of  Defense and Peace 
29  Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”.
30   Afif  Sholahuddin, Membangun Centrum Gerakan di Era Liberalisasi. (Jakarta: 
PB PMII, 2004).
31  Hefner, ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia.
32  Dadang Juliantara, “Kelas Menengah Muslim dalam Medan Perubahan: 
Sebuah Catatan tentang ICMI”, in ICMI Negara dan Demokrasi: Catatan Kritis Kaum Muda, 
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1988-1993, deemed the more influential and have a strong influence in 
ABRI caused Soeharto to be cautious for fear that ABRI would weaken 
his position as president. Therefore, Soeharto changed and appointed 
“his men” who were faithful to several positions in ABRI.33
In addition, in the mid-1980s, Indonesian Muslims began to accept 
Pancasila as the sole foundation of  the country. In this case, Soeharto 
thought that there will be no threat from Muslims to oppose Pancasila 
as the state ideology and establish an Islamic state. Although Muslims 
were sidelined from the country’s development and political aspects, in 
terms of  cultural aspects and social life, Muslims were said to have risen 
very progressively and had a bright future.34 Matters such as these made 
Soeharto more comfortable to choose the Islamic groups as allies to 
maintain the status quo as Indonesian president in the next election. In 
fact, Hefner stated that after the pilgrimage, Soeharto added Muhammad 
as his first name.35 This suggested that Soeharto effort to bridge the 
relationship with Muslims was as a political interest.
The rise of  Islam and the middle class Muslim communities in 
Indonesia began with the establishment of  ICMI at the end of  1990 in 
conjunction with the National Symposium of  Muslim Scholars at the 
Student Center, University of  Brawijaya, Malang on 6-8 December 1990. 
On 6 December 1990 in Malang, with traditional pondok (Islamic school) 
students attire36, while uttering Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, President Soeharto 
inaugurated the National Symposium entitled “Muslim Intellectuals: 
Developing Society of  XXI Century”.37 Then, 7th December was set as the 
birth date of  ICMI. The three-day symposium was attended by some 
500 Muslim scholars throughout Indonesia.38
ed. by Zuli Qodir and Lalu M. Iqbal Songell (Yogyakarta: Kelompok Studi Lingkaran 
Pustaka Pelajar, 1995).
33 Douglas E. Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia: Demokrasi, Islam, dan Ideologi 
Toleransi, trans. by Hartono Hadikusumo (Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2002).
34 Tanthowi, Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri.
35 Hefner, ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia, p. 89.
36 Ibid. 
37  M.  Syafi’i  Anwar  (ed.),  ICMI: Kelahiran dan Misi (Jakarta: Departemen 
Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia ICMI, 1994).
38 A. Makmur Makka and Dhurorudin Mashad, ICMI: Dinamika Politik Islam 
di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka CIDESINDO, 1997).
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The establishment of  ICMI is in fact an initiative of  students from 
the Faculty of  Engineering, Universitas Brawijaya who merged the Islamic 
spirituality groups at the university. The background of  the establishment 
of  ICMI stemmed from the polarisation in the leadership of  the Muslims.39 
There are a number of  Islamic groups in Indonesia, such as Paramadina in 
Jakarta, Salman in Bandung and Al-Fatah in Surabaya with each standing 
alone without forming a larger Islamic organisation, so much so that 
their ideas and thoughts were not integrated and mutually reinforcing.
J. Pros and Cons of  ICMI Birth 
The establishment of  Islamic-based scholar organisations turned 
out to be warmly received from middle class Muslim communities 
especially among the intellectuals. Apart from Indonesian Muslims and 
education figures, the symposium was also attended by cabinet ministers. 
Leaders from the Muslim and education circles present included Prof. 
Dr. Harun Nasution, Prof. Dr. A. Baiquni, Dr. Amin Rais, Dr. Nurcholis 
Madjid, Dr. Muslimin Nasution, and Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas. While 
among the cabinet ministers were B.J Habibie (Minister of  Research and 
Technology), Emil Salim (Minister of  Environment), Munawir Sjadzali 
(Minister of  Religion), Azwar Anas (Minister of  Transportation) and 
Fuad Hassan (Minister of  Education and Culture). The symposium was 
officiated by Indonesian President Soeharto at that time, whom finally 
chose and appointed B.J. Habibie as  the first head of  ICMI.40 At the 
second General Assembly of  ICMI in 1995, B.J. Habibie was reelected 
as head of  ICMI and President Soeharto was appointed as patron.41
B.J. Habibie’s appointment, who is also a minister in Soeharto’s 
cabinet as the first Head of  ICMI in 1990 and Soeharto’s willingness 
to be the patron of  this organisation, made ICMI as the only Islamic 
organisation (based on Pancasila) fully supported by the government. 
Support received from the government has opened a larger space for 
ICMI to communicate ideas, vision and criticism over the government’s 
39 ”Ibid.; Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”.
40  Makka and Mashad, ICMI.
41   Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”; Robert W. Hefner, “Global Violence 
and Indonesian Muslim Politics”, American Anthropologist, vol. 104, no. 3 (2002), pp. 
754–65.
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policies that affect the interests of  the Muslim communities. However, 
ICMI friendly relations with the government received criticism from 
various quarters. They regarded that the ideas, visions and criticisms 
from ICMI to the government ineffective because the main leaders of  
ICMI are people who are in the government itself.
The presence of  the cabinet ministers and President Soeharto 
who officiated the symposium has attracted a variety of  negative public 
reaction. They criticized that the formation of  ICMI was simply as a 
“license” for the government to make ICMI a tool for the benefit of  
their administration.42 The critics say that ICMI only served as a tool of  
the government so that there is no place for them to criticize and give 
independent and open recommendations to the government. ICMI was 
seen as a counterweight43 or counterbalance measures44 over the powers of  
ABRI by Soeharto. This is due to the increasing dominance of  ABRI and 
Soeharto was worried by this situation, not to mention the relationship 
between Soeharto and leaders of  ABRI at that time began to deteriorate.45
In addition, ICMI was also considered a primordial organisation. 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), whom at that time served as Head of  
PB-NU (Committee Members-Nahdlatul Ulama/The Awakening of  
Traditional Religious Teachers and Scholar), refused to join ICMI as he 
considered its primordial nature will divide the nation’s and scholars’ 
integration and would not help in catalysing national development.46 He 
also mentioned that ICMI had exclusive stance, sectarian, anti-Pancasila, 
manipulated Islam and merely a Muslim organisation “exploited” by 
Soeharto for political purposes only.47
Another NU figure, Chalid Mawardi, questioned the importance 
42 Ramage, Percaturan politik di Indonesia.
43  David McKendrick, “Indonesia in 1991: Growth, Privilege, and Rules”, Asian 
Survey, vol. 32, no. 2 (1992), pp. 103–110.
44 Jacques Bertrand, “False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: 
Flirting with Openness in Indonesia”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (1996), pp. 319–340.
45 Andrew MacIntyre, “Indonesia in 1993: Increasing Political Movement?”, 
Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 2 (1994), pp. 111–118.
46 Makka and Mashad, ICMI.
47 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia; Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”; 
Makka and Mashad, ICMI; Ahmad Bahar, ICMI: Kekuasaan dan Demokrasi (Yogyakarta: 
APena Cendekia Indonesia, 1995).
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of  the establishment of  ICMI, especially when associated with politics. 
Chalid argued that the establishment of  ICMI was merely a political 
manipulation. He added since the existence of  ICMI was merely as a 
political manipulator, then this organization would only be exclusive and 
not giving attention to the social problems happening at the grassroots 
level. ICMI was deemed to give more attention to the development of  
science and technology and modern management with sophisticated 
system, to the extent that the problems of  poverty, injustice and 
democracy in the lower strata of  society were not given the attention it 
deserves.48
Iqbal Assegaf, Head of  the Indonesian Islamic Students Movement 
(PMII) from 1988 to 1991, expressed the same opinion about the 
establishment of  ICMI. He said the existence of  ICMI will not give any 
benefit to the middle class Muslim. Since the existence of  ICMI was as 
a political manipulator, which would only channel political aspiration of  
ICMI members, then ICMI should not be established.49
However, the allegation that ICMI was an organisation that is 
primordial and would not affect the development of  the country, and 
disrupted national integration was purely seen from a political standpoint. 
In fact, the existence of  ICMI should be viewed from the perspective of  
the importance of  culture, social, goals, mission and impact that would 
arise from ICMI in the national development and middle class Muslim 
interests. According to Emha Ainun Najib, an Indonesian cultural figure, 
ICMI is like a vehicle. He gave an example, to go to Jakarta, one can use a 
wide range of  transportation such as bus, train, airplane, car, motorcycle 
and even ”crawl”. Whatever vehicle is used, it is not important. What 
matter is the destination is Jakarta.50
Amin Rais, General Head of  Muhammadiyah (1995-2000), said 
that the existence of  ICMI in the midst of  the Indonesian society was 
indispensable because at that time there wasn’t any organisation that brings 
together Muslim scholars with different work background. He added 
that the existence of  ICMI was needed to overcome the backwardness 
of  Muslims in Indonesia in the field of  science and technology and the 
48 Makka and Mashad, ICMI.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. 
358 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Riki Rahman & Faisal S. Hazis
social problems rampant in Muslim communities due to the impact of  
science and technology.51
In connection with the assumption that Soeharto “takes advantage” 
of  ICMI for his political interests, Hasan Basri, Head of  MUI (Indonesian 
Ulama Council) 1984 to 1990, said that ICMI is not a vassal of  the 
ruling party. ICMI is only cooperating with the government to develop 
the nation and country.52 M. Dawam Rahardjo reiterated Hassan Basri’s 
statement that the relationship between ICMI and the government is a 
partnership in order to build and develop the country.53 Therefore, ICMI 
can deliver its voice without fear of  being blocked by the government 
to form Muslim communities (not Islamic country) in Indonesia. The 
Muslim communities meant that the nature of  national legislation is 
imbedded with the values  of  Islam.54
K. ICMI’s Roles in the Rise of  Middle Class Muslim Communities 
in Indonesia
ICMI’s roles in advancing middle class Muslim communities can 
be seen from education and economic sectors, the consolidation of  the 
Islamic movement in Indonesia sectors, and the political agenda sectors. 
In the education sector, ICMI has provided scholarships to middle class 
Muslim students who studied at any university in Indonesia through 
the established Abdi Bangsa Foundation.55 Although the government 
has provided scholarships to outstanding students, it is not focused on 
Muslim students only but also non-Muslims. Unlike the government, 
the ICMI only granted scholarships to middle class Muslim students. In 
addition, the establishment of  Insan Cendekia School which is a high 




53 Ahmad Baso, Civil Society versus Masyarakat Madani: Arkeologi Pemikiran “Civil 
Society” dalam Islam Indonesia (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999).
54 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia.
55 Ibid. 
56 The school was founded in 1996, a brainchild of  B.J. Habibie where his 
education system incorporates the concept IPTEK (Science and Technology) and 
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Meanwhile in the economic field, ICMI managed to realise its goal 
to help the progress of  the middle class Muslim communities through 
the establishment of  Bank Muamalat, Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) 
and Bank Syariah.57 The establishment of  these Islamic banks (other 
than BPR) is seen as a counterweight to the conventional banks which 
were growing rapidly, generally controlled and owned by non-Muslims. 
Therefore, as the followers of  the largest religion in Indonesia, the 
Muslim communities should have its own bank with Islamic-based 
operational systems. ICMI also established PINBUK (Small Business 
Incubation Center) in 1995 to encourage middle class Muslims to become 
entrepreneurs, especially small and medium sized business sector.58 While 
ALISA Khadijah (Indonesian Muslim Association of  Entrepreneurs) 
which was established in 1997, is an entrepreneur organisation under 
the auspice of  ICMI that is specifically intended for Muslim women.59
The second objective of  ICMI is to unite the various movements 
or sects of  Islam in Indonesia. Separation of  the two largest Muslim 
organisations in Indonesia that were NU which was perceived as 
traditional and Muhammadiyah as modern was irrelevant. Nasir Tamara, 
one of  the main leaders of  ICMI, said that the purpose of  ICMI is as 
a place where “all Muslims (from different movements and sects) can 
meet”.60 Abdurrahman Wahid criticism against the establishment of  ICMI 
widen the gap between NU and ICMI - government, so much so that 
many leaders of  NU and its members express their dissatisfaction over 
the attitude of  the Head of  PB-NU. Anyway, in the end Abdurrahman 
Wahid gave freedom to NU members to join ICMI.61 Some NU members 
who joined ICMI were Yusuf  Hasyim (NU figure who is the uncle of  
Abdurrahman Wahid), Ali Yafie (former Rais Am of  NU) and Achmad 
IMTAK (Faith and Piety). This school is a full boarding school located in Serpong, 
Banten and Gorontalo, Sulawesi, please see http://manicserpong.com/sejarah-insan-
cendekia-dan-bj-habibe/, accessed  5 June 2017.
57 Makka and Mashad, ICMI. 
58 For further information, please refer to http://pinbuk.id/ accessed 5 June 
2017.
59 For further information, please refer to http://www.icmi.or.id/lembaga/
view/alisa_khadijah, accessed  5 June 2017.
60 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia.
61 Tanthowi, Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri.
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Buchori Masruri (NU Regional Head of  Central Java). While Amin Rais 
(General Head of  Muhammadiyah) and Din Syamsuddin (Youth Head 
of  Muhammadiyah) was a representative of  the ICMI.62 
ICMI’s political agendas as the third goal are demilitarisation63, 
democratisation and proportionalisation64. In the process of  
demilitarisation as stated by ICMI, although this objective has not 
been successful, it has affected the relationship between ICMI and 
ABRI. Dawam Rahardjo, an ICMI figure, said disagreements over the 
nomination of  General Try Sutrisno  (Commander of  ABRI 1988  to 
1993) as a candidate for 6th Vice President of  the Republic of  Indonesia. 
Instead, Dawam mentioned that B.J. Habibie was the most qualified for 
the position to accompany President Soeharto. Dawam’s statement was 
regarded by senior ABRI leaders that ICMI is an anti-ABRI organisation. 
The ICMI – ABRI relationship deteriorated when ABRI described ICMI 
as an extremist organisation and seeks to establish an Islamic state in 
Indonesia.65
ABRI realised that when demilitarisation which is one of  ICMI’s 
political agenda is agreed by the government, the role of  ABRI in politics 
would be significantly reduced or even abolished. Therefore, ABRI would 
do anything to prevent ICMI’s political agenda from happening. Although 
the goal of  demilitarisation has not been successful, at least ICMI has 
managed to raise discourse on the elimination of  ABRI’s involvement 
in the Indonesian political arena. Therefore, it could open the minds of  
the people that the involvement of  ABRI in politics is not necessary 
because it could narrow the democratic space.
As for the agenda of  democratisation, leaders of  ICMI such as 
62 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia.
63 Demilitarisation means to abolish the space for ABRI to play a political role. 
As already known, prior to the enactment of  the reform, ABRI played an important 
role in Indonesian politics through the ruling party at that time, Golkar. Many from 
ABRI and former ABRI became managers and committee members of  Golkar. 
64 In this context, what is meant by proportionalisation is ICMI demanded 
that key positions in ABRI, parliament and the cabinet must be rationalised with the 
number of  followers of  existing religions in Indonesia. Since the number of  Muslims 
in Indonesia was 88 percent, it is fitting that 88 per cent of  the important positions in 
ABRI, parliament and the cabinet were given to Muslims.
65 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia.
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Adi Sasono, Din Syamsuddin, Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas and Dawam Rahardjo agreed that a more transparent and 
independent political system was needed in Indonesia. However, there 
was a difference of  opinion among them about whether democracy is 
the main goal or not. Imaduddin Abdurrahim was one of  the leaders 
who agreed with democracy, but: when people are still ignorant, backward 
and poor, I do not require the existence of  democracy.66
Although the realisation of  democratisation in Indonesia was not 
going well at the time, the space for freedom of  expression began to open 
up. In this case, ICMI managed to publish its own newspaper, Republika, 
in 1993 as a medium for them to convey thoughts, ideas, thoughts or 
criticism. The interesting fact is that the capital of  the newspaper was 
funded entirely by Muslims.67 The emergence of  Republika was considered 
a competitor to Kompas, a newspaper dominated by Christians. ICMI also 
managed to establish CIDES (Center for Information and Development 
Studies), a body which examines the development of  the Indonesian 
middle class Muslims. Some Indonesian scholars considered that CIDES 
is a competitor to the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) 
owned by Christian.68
ICMI’s last political agenda is proportionalisation. In this context, 
ICMI required that key positions in ABRI, parliament and the cabinet 
must be rationalised with the number of  followers of  existing religions 
in Indonesia. This was because during Soeharto’s ruling, key positions 
were always occupied by Christians. As the number of  Muslims was 
higher than followers of  other religions, by almost 88 percent, then the 
provision for the Muslims for these important positions had to be larger. 
This political agenda was somewhat successful when Soeharto announced 
a new  cabinet  lineup  shortly  after Golkar’s  and Soeharto’s  victory  in 
the 1993 general election. In his cabinet lineup, Soeharto reduced the 
number of  ministers and in parliament who were Christians.69 Similarly 
66 Ibid.    
67 Makka and Mashad, ICMI.  
68 Ramage, Percaturan politik di Indonesia; Saiful Mujani, “Mitos Politik Aliran 
dan Aspirasi Politik ICMI Modernis”, Studia Islamika, vol. 2, no. 1 (1995), pp. 209–42.
69 Suryadinata, “Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto’s 
Indonesia”.
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for key positions in ABRI. Soeharto appointed General Feisal Tanjung 
as Commander of  ABRI. Subsequently in 1995, he appointed General 
Hartono who has close ties to Muslim clerics as the Army Chief  of  Staff.70 
Feisal Tanjung and Hartono are both known as Muslim who have close 
ties with B. J. Habibie and ICMI.71 
L.  A Glimpse of  Development of  the ICMI during the Reform Era
The  significant  role  of   ICMI  in  the  development  of  middle 
class Muslims during the New Order era has made it a great and very 
important Islamic organization. Moreover when Habibie was in power 
after the fall of  the New Order in 1998. However, since the fall of  the 
New Order, the ICMI’s role has not been significant, even as it has been 
drowned during the reform era. All circles, including ICMI’s own cadres, 
acknowledged that after Habibie failed to maintain his power, ICMI’s 
subsequent efforts faded.72 Moreover, the figure of  post-reform ruler 
is Abdurrahman Wahid. The figure who from the beginning criticized 
the existence of  ICMI, and also refused to join ICMI. This situation 
persists when Indonesia is under Megawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and President Jokowi. We are not sure, why this scenario could happen, 
maybe further studies have to be carried out. 
M. Concluding Remarks
Muslims in the New Order were sidelined by the government due 
to the reason that they wanted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
This led to Muslims not able to play a more active role in developing 
the country and Muslims themselves. However, in the late 1980s, at the 
time when Soeharto’s relationship with ABRI deteriorated, Soeharto’s 
attitude toward the Muslims changed. At the same time, most middle 
class Muslim communities sought to create one Muslim organisation in 
which all Muslim leaders from various organisations can unite. For this 
reason, the ICMI was born in 1990 in which Soeharto himself  became 
its patron.
70  Rizal Mallarangeng and R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 1995: The Struggle 
for Power and Policy”, Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 2 (1996), pp. 109–116.
71 Ramage, Percaturan Politik di Indonesia. 
72  Guntoro Saparie, “Upaya Revitalisasi ICMI Jateng”, Suara Merdeka (2006).
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The existence of  ICMI has raised controversy among the middle 
class Muslim communities themselves. This was due to the support 
given by the government to ICMI previously unprecedented in the 
history of  Islamic organisations in Indonesia during the New Order. 
Thus, according to opposing parties, ICMI was just the government’s 
servant so it would not be free to submit ideas, suggestions or criticism 
on government policies particularly related to matters of  middle class 
Muslims. Furthermore, the Head of  ICMI, B. J. Habibie was within the 
government. Meanwhile, its supporters would defend ICMI with various 
arguments. Among the argument they put forward was that ICMI is not 
a government servant but as a partner in building and developing the 
country and the middle class Muslims of  Indonesia.
Notwithstanding, in spite of  the controversies, ICMI  managed 
to position itself  as a pioneer in the revival of  the middle class Muslim 
communities in Indonesia. This can be seen from the roles it played in 
terms of  education and the economy, unifying the Islamic movements in 
Indonesia, their involvement in the political sector such as demilitarisation, 
democratisation and proportionalisation that have major impact on the 
middle class Muslim communities in Indonesia.
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